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FOREWORD
Survey after survey across the U.S. Army continue
to reveal broad concern about the Army’s top-down
performance evaluation system. Many claim that it
drives behavior in organizations that not only inhibits the exercise of mission command, but also rewards
image management over organizational leadership.
Colonel Curtis Taylor takes a hard look at this
system, its benefits and its cultural incentives. More
importantly, he asks if the current system promotes
or impedes the exercise of mission command. After
examining the history of the Army’s performance
evaluation system and alternative models outside the
military, Colonel Taylor concludes that a more holistic
system that combines top-down evaluations, peer and
subordinate evaluation, and objective testing might be
a better approach.
The Strategic Studies Institute offers this monograph to enable its readers to assess whether the
recommended system may balance incentives more
carefully, ensuring that the very best organizational
leaders are easier to identify, assign, and promote.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
CURTIS D. TAYLOR is an active duty U.S. Army Armor Officer with 21 years of experience in operational
and training assignments including four tours to Iraq
and Afghanistan as a strategic planner, battalion operations officer, brigade operations officer, and battalion commander. Most recently, he served as the
Director of the Commander’s Initiatives Group for the
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
responsible for drafting an integrated strategy for investment in human dimension programs such as leader development, education, and talent management
across the Army. In 2015, Colonel Taylor is slated to
assume command of the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado.
Colonel Taylor holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S.
Military Academy, and two master’s degrees from the
Command and General Staff College in military art
and science and in strategic studies.

ix

SUMMARY
In 2014, the National Defense Authorization Act
directed the Department of Defense to reconsider the
way the Army evaluates and selects leaders. This call
for reform came after repeated surveys from the Center for Army Leadership suggested widespread dissatisfaction with the current approach. The U.S. Army
today is seeking to inculcate a philosophy of mission
command across the force based on a culture of mutual trust, clear intent, and decentralized initiative. It
is, therefore, reasonable to ask if our current performance evaluation system contributes or detracts from
such a culture.
This monograph seeks to answer this question by
considering the essential leader attributes required for
the exercise of mission command and then considering
practical methods for evaluating this behavior. It then
reviews the history of the existing Army performance
evaluation system and analyzes how well this system
conforms to the attributes of mission command. Finally, it examines other methods of performance evaluation outside of the Army to determine if those methods could provide a better model. This examination
included a variety of best practice models in private
business and the public sector and identified alternative approaches to performance evaluation. Three
alternative models were chosen for scrutiny because
they demonstrated an ability to specifically identify
and select for the leader attributes essential to mission
command.
The monograph concludes that the U.S. Army’s
current officer evaluation system is ill-suited to evaluate mission command attributes. The author’s findings suggest that our current system is not wrong,

xi

but rather is incomplete. The research suggests that a
combination of top-down evaluations, peer and subordinate reviews, and objective testing of critical skills
might equip U.S. Army boards to identify better the
best practitioners of the mission command philosophy. Two specific proposals are suggested for further
research in the appendix. The first proposes to conduct
background investigations for command select positions modelled after the single scope background investigation security clearance interviews. The second
proposes the creation of assessment centers within the
U.S. Army to evaluate potential to perform in future
assignments.
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BREAKING THE BATHSHEBA SYNDROME:
BUILDING A PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION SYSTEM
THAT PROMOTES MISSION COMMAND
INTRODUCTION
[The] greatest challenge facing your Army and my
main worry [is]: How can the Army break up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignments and promotion processes, in order to retain,
challenge, and inspire its best, brightest, and most
battle-tested young officers to lead the service in the
future?
		
		
		

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
February 2011,
Address to U.S. Military Academy Cadets

A recent series of press reports describing senior
officer misconduct have tarnished the image of the
Army profession in the eyes of the American public.
These incidents caused Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel to speculate in a press conference on February 5,
2014, that the military may suffer from systemic problems in the way it selects and promotes leaders.1 Recognizing these systemic problems, the 2014 National
Defense Authorization Act directed the Department
of Defense (DoD) to assess the feasibility of fundamentally changing its performance evaluation system
by including peer and subordinate evaluations in the
promotion, assignment, and selection of its leaders.2
These two externals calls for change combine with
growing pressure within the Army to reconsider performance evaluation. Three recent surveys conducted
by the Center for Army Leadership suggest growing

1

distrust among junior leaders in the ability of the Army
as an institution to promote and select the best leaders.3 These studies indicate widespread belief among
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) that
the skills and abilities required to succeed before a
promotion board are not the ones most valuable to the
organizations that they lead. These pressures come at
a difficult time for the military when the identification
of talent is of paramount importance.
Because of the Budget Control Act of 2011, the
Army faces a 20 percent reduction in forces over the
next 5 years.4 As a result, the Army must cut deep into
its talent pool while retaining its very best. The situation suggests that the time is right for the Army to
reconsider its approach to talent management.
The Army currently evaluates leadership potential
primarily through an annual Officer Efficiency Report
(OER) prepared by the officer’s immediate supervisor and a senior officer. The OER has evolved over
time, and the 10th version is slated to go into effect
this year.5 While each version of the OER has taken a
slightly different approach to how information is organized, the fundamental premise behind Army performance evaluation has remained unchanged. This
premise holds that superiors in the immediate chain
of command are the best observers with both the position and experience necessary to evaluate the leadership abilities of an officer.
Re-evaluating the Army’s approach to performance evaluation requires an understanding of the
leader attributes and behaviors that the Army seeks
within its future force. In June 2013, the Chief of Staff
of the Army directed that the philosophy of mission
command would serve as the cornerstone of the Army
leader development strategy. Mission command has
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been used as a formal military concept at least since
the Prussian Army reforms in the early-19th century
following the Napoleonic wars. The Prussians used
the term Auftragstaktik, literally “mission tactics,” to
define a philosophy of command that emphasized
intent-based orders and subordinate officer initiative.6
A White Paper on mission command from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey further elaborated the desired cultural attributes of this philosophy. Summarizing Dempsey, disciplined initiative demands the artful combination of
two often-competing character traits: creative ingenuity and a rigid adherence to specified intent. Balancing
these two competing requirements demands a culture
of trust and candor between senior and subordinate
officers. Leaders must have confidence in the technical competence of their subordinates. Subordinates
likewise, must feel empowered to take reasonable risk
and pursue the overall best interests of their mission
even at the cost of short-term performance.7
If the mission command philosophy defines the
culture that the Army seeks to promote, then a wellstructured performance evaluation system should assess the Army leader’s ability to adhere to this philosophy. As the Secretary of Defense and others consider
changes to performance evaluation in the Army, it is
useful to determine how well the current system assesses the critical leader attributes and behaviors of
mission command. Specifically, can the current Army
performance evaluation system properly assess and
select officers suited to exercise mission command?
Answering this research question required six
steps. First, it was necessary to understand the essential leader attributes and behaviors necessary for the
exercise of mission command. These attributes were
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well-documented in relevant Army doctrinal publications. It was also useful to consider the history of the
mission command concept itself and how this concept
influenced the evolution of performance evaluation
in the military profession. Second, having established
the types of leader behavior most valuable to the exercise of mission command, it became necessary to
consider methods for evaluating this behavior. Doing
so requires a review of the research in the field of talent management to identify appropriate evaluation
methods. These two steps established the outline of a
performance evaluation system optimized to measure
mission command attributes.
The third step required a review of the history
and design of the existing Army performance evaluation system. Understanding how the existing system
evolved into its present form clarified the leader attributes it was originally intended to assess. In the fourth
step, it was necessary to evaluate how well the existing
system conformed to the attributes established earlier.
This required a review of the extensive research done
by the Army into the effectiveness of its existing performance evaluation model. A careful examination of
the existing structure of this system and its cultural
effects revealed that the current system, as it stands,
detracts from the exercise of mission command.
Fifth, having established that the existing system
failed to assess critical elements of mission command,
it was necessary to investigate other methods of performance evaluation outside of the Army to determine
if those methods could provide a better model. The
research examined a variety of best practice models in
private business and the public sector and identified
alternative approaches to performance evaluation.
Three alternative models were chosen for scrutiny
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because they demonstrated an ability specifically to
identify and select for the leader attributes essential to
mission command. These leader behaviors were poorly evaluated under the Army’s existing single-source
performance appraisal system. A cursory examination
of alternate approaches did not conclusively prove
that the Army would benefit by adopting any particular model. It did suggest, however, that other models
or a combination of models might improve the Army’s
proficiency in assessing the attributes it believes are
most important.
Finally, any change to the performance evaluation
system in a large government bureaucracy like the
military will face both legal and cultural obstacles. It
was necessary to evaluate these obstacles and consider the potential pitfalls associated with reforming the
existing system. Judging the feasibility of such reform
required a review of the statutory framework under
which the Army promotes its officers. In addition, it
was useful to consider the lessons learned from other
organizations that have attempted similar reforms
to assess if any of those lessons are appropriate to
the Army.
The research ultimately showed that the current
evaluation system, centered on the OER, cannot fully
assess the fitness of officers for mission command.
Furthermore, the alternative models examined in
this research provide insight into methods already
prevalent in the civilian world that may improve the
Army’s ability to assess mission command oriented
leadership. Talent management models that combine the top-down, senior leader evaluation with
subordinate evaluations and objective testing appear
to provide a more holistic view of performance and
potential. A broader approach to performance evalua-
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tion eliminates blind spots inherent in a single-source
evaluation system and can assess a leader’s impact on
internal organizational climate better than the current
system. This evidence suggests that the Army must
carefully investigate alternative evaluation processes
if it is to consciously identify and select officers that
meet the requirements of mission command. Finally,
as an appendix to this monograph, two specific proposals are offered for further research that seek to operationalize this broader approach in a coherent and
prudent manner.
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF MISSION
COMMAND
Mission command is defined as the “the exercise
of authority and direction by the commander using
mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within
the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.”8 Effective mission command, therefore,
demands specific behaviors on the part of both the
superior and subordinate. Because virtually every officer in the Army is simultaneously a superior and a
subordinate, an effective evaluation must assess both
sets of behaviors.
Army doctrine identifies the first principle of mission command as “the building of cohesive teams
through mutual trust.”9 Stephen M. Covey, in The Speed
of Trust, identified mutual trust in an organization as a
crucial factor that reduces costs, increases agility, and
enables the organization to adapt to complexity or
adversity. Dr. Covey argues that high-trusting organizations enjoy a “trust dividend” that allows them to
perform better in the market place, react better to adversity, and retain a larger portion of their best talent.
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Likewise, organizations with low-trust cultures pay a
“trust tax” that drains profits through costly regulation and high personnel turnover rates.10 It is this trust
dividend that, according to Dempsey, lies at the heart
of the Army’s pursuit of a mission command culture.11
Since trust is such an important component of the
mission command philosophy, it is useful to explore
its meaning in greater detail. While researchers have
offered definitions for trust, the one most applicable to
its usage in mission command is suggested by Roger
Mayer, James Davis, and F. David Schoorman in a 1995
research paper for the Academy of Management Review.
They define trust as “the willingness of a party to be
vulnerable to the outcomes of another party based on
the expectation that the other will perform a particular
action important to the trustor.”12 It is this vulnerability that distinguishes trust from mere cooperation. In
effect, trust is defined by a willingness by the trustor
to accept risk.
The research by Mayer and others goes on to identify three factors most important in influencing the
perceived trustworthiness of a potential trustee. These
factors are ability, benevolence, and integrity.13 Ability is the measure of a trustee’s physical and mental
capacity to meet expectations. Benevolence is the measure of the trustee’s perceived willingness to do good
to the trustor. Integrity is the measure of the trustee’s
adherence to an agreed set of principles and priorities.14 Trustworthiness is therefore, a combination of
technical competence and demonstrated commitment
to others and to universally agreed principles.
Simply being trustworthy, however, is not sufficient. An effective practitioner of mission command
must likewise possess the capacity to trust others.
Colonel Tom Guthrie, when Director of the Center for
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Army Leadership, pointed out the all-too-common
phenomenon of leaders demanding trust from their
superiors and then denying it to their subordinates.
“If leaders only want mission command to exist above
their level, then we will be limiting its intended and
desired effect.”15 While it could be argued that a senior
leader can evaluate effectively the trustworthiness of
his subordinates along the lines proposed by Mayer,
evaluating their ability to trust and empower others is
much more problematic.
Before turning to the literature on performance
evaluation methods and practices, it is useful first to
look closer at the historical antecedent for the modern
concept of mission command. This review is helpful
because it shows how previous attempts to inculcate
mission command into organizational culture demanded both increased professionalism and a broader
approach to performance appraisal.
A History of Mission Command.
The modern concept of mission command first
emerged in Prussia following the Prussian Army’s
rapid defeats at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt in
1806. Prussian leaders recognized that the only plausible response to Napoleon’s genius was to develop
a warfighting organization that could out-think and
out-maneuver its opponent by radically decentralizing battlefield decisionmaking. As the Prussian leadership sought to formalize this new decentralized
approach, its detractors gave it the pejorative moniker “Auftragstaktik” to distinguish it from traditional
methods of command known as “Normaltaktik.”16
Perhaps more than any other leader, Field Marshal
Helmuth von Moltke was most responsible for insti-
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tutionalizing the concept of Auftragstaktik in Prussian
military doctrine.17 Moltke observed that the increased
dispersion of forces driven by the improvement in the
accuracy of firearms demanded a change to the way
small unit leaders behaved on the battlefield. He believed that orders given to subordinates in combat
should define a desired military outcome and the
absolute minimum boundary conditions necessary
to achieve that outcome. The details of achieving the
end state should be left to the initiative of the subordinate commander.18 This allowed subordinate commanders to exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities
without having to consult with the higher command.
Implementing this concept required changes to both
doctrine and culture within the Prussian military.
Subordinate commanders could no longer simply
execute rote drill procedures as they did in the days
of Frederick the Great. They now needed to foster a
culture of professionalism and trust within their organizations to encourage the junior officer initiative
and independent judgment that was the foundation
of Auftragstaktik.
The shift from rote execution of orders to a culture
of subordinate initiative led to changes in the way the
Prussian War College known as the Kriegsacademie
trained and prepared its officers. The Kriegsacademie,
established in 1810, the Prussian Army’s nadir, had
emerged by 1860 to become the premier military educational institution in Europe if not the world.19 Officers were nominated for attendance after 5 years of
service and had to undergo a grueling 10-day entrance
examination prior to admission.20 For Von Moltke, the
link between the academic rigor of the Kriegsacademie
and the execution of Auftragstaktik was self-evident.
The only way to ensure disciplined initiative was for
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field grade and flag commanders to arrive on the battlefield already experts in the tactical employment of
their forces. Education alone was not enough. These
officers had to be fully certified through a rigorous
professional examination process not unlike a lawyer or doctor is today. This ensured that when fleeting tactical opportunity presented itself, they would
be equipped with the judgment to exploit it. Without
professional certification, Auftragstaktik was merely a
recipe for creative disorder.
As Prussian and subsequent German military traditions were subsumed by Nazi ideology in the 1930s,
the role of Auftragstaktik in German doctrine and praxis waned.21 However, the traditional belief persisted
that effective combat leadership demanded a culture
of trust within and between military organizations.
The Wehrmacht recognized that the organizational climate necessary for a culture of trust was difficult to
assess from outside the organization. As a result, the
Wehrmacht developed the first documented use of subordinate and peer evaluations.22 In the 1950s, several
civilian corporations studied this practice and adopted it within their own corporate personnel systems.23
While the modern concept of mission command
embodied in Army doctrine today differs in some significant ways from the 19th century concept of Auftragstaktik, its core tenant of disciplined initiative based
on mutual trust, remains the same. This review of
the Prussian experience demonstrates how the move
toward Auftragstaktik promoted a need for greater
professional competence at lower levels in the chain
of command and a desire to look outside traditional
methods of performance evaluation to find ways to
assess a leader’s impact on organizational culture
and process.
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The Army’s recent move toward mission command philosophy suggests that it, like the Prussian
Army of the 19th century, is placing increasing value
on internal organizational process rather than on organizational output. Where the Prussians were reacting to the need to fight outnumbered on an increasingly dispersed battlefield, American Army leaders
today must deal with complex battlefield conditions.
Further complicating this complexity is the gradual
evolution in the nature of warfare in the information
age. Several authors have shown that events on the
21st century battlefield can now have strategic consequences that far outweigh their tactical effects.24 In
this context, how a leader accomplishes his mission
is increasingly important. A rifle company is no longer a black box that produces combat effects. How
a military unit produces those effects can often have
tremendous strategic impact. As a result, the internal
dynamics of a military unit are increasingly relevant
to the overall organization. Evaluating and selecting
leaders based on their impact on the internal dynamics of their organization rather than their organizational output demands a different approach to talent
management. Fortunately, the science of performance
evaluation has expanded greatly since the Army published its first version of the OER in the early-1970s. A
survey of the considerable body of research on performance evaluation will show what methods of talent
management are suited to assess the leader’s contribution to the internal dynamics of his unit. Specifically,
this survey will consider the benefits and liabilities
of various performance evaluation methods to help
identify those methods that might align better with a
philosophy of mission command.
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A LITERATURE SURVEY ON PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
Research in the field of talent management has
shown that an effective performance evaluation system must provide both the means and the metrics to
measure the attributes deemed most valuable to the
organization. This process is described in the literature
as the alignment of business strategy to talent management strategy.25 The preceding section established
that mission command, like its predecessor, Auftragstaktik, can only function effectively within a specific
organizational climate. That climate must exhibit two
primary attributes: First, mission command thrives in
a culture where trust is both given and received; and
second, there must exist a culture of professional competence based on demonstrated ability.
Research by Gregory Kesler, among others, has
examined the relationships between appraisal systems and organizational culture and concluded that
top-down, single-source evaluation methods tend to
promote a results-oriented culture in which output
is valued over process.26 Senior leaders are best positioned to evaluate the relative value of a subordinate
leader’s organizational output and its contribution to
the larger enterprise, but they are often poorly positioned to assess the internal organizational dynamics
of subordinate teams. This is particularly true in cases,
often seen in profit-oriented businesses, where organizational output is relatively objective and measurable.
Over time, the incentive structure shapes organizational behavior to value the cultivation of loyalty from
senior managers over all other modes of performance.
A Vice President of Capital One echoed this sentiment
when he stated:
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In my former company, we paid lip service to decentralized, rapid decision-making but never rewarded
the people who did it best. Top-down evaluations
simply aren’t perceptive. The 360 degree system highlights the truly independent thinkers, and we’re a better company because we identify and reward them.27

Some studies have even suggested that less than 25
percent of an individual manager’s effectiveness is
observable by his boss.28
Tracy Mallet, Chief Executive Officer for the management consulting firm DecisionWise, opined that
a large majority of companies that rely exclusively
on single-source evaluation techniques find those
methods lead to an inaccurate perception of performance.29 Single-source evaluation methods create an
opportunity for an individual leader to adapt so well
to the incentive structure that he essentially creates
two separate worlds—one for his superiors and one
for his organization. This conclusion is supported by
exhaustive statistical analysis by Emily Lai, Edward
Wolfe, and Daisy Vickers, who argued that singlesource assessment systems are uniquely vulnerable
to the halo effect and confirmation bias.30 A well-documented cognitive bias, the halo effect, occurs when
a high-performer in one well-observed domain is assumed to perform equally well in other unobserved
domains. Employees who can successfully orchestrate
positive interactions in highly-observable activities,
such as briefings before superiors, benefit from this
cognitive bias.
Recent scholarship on single-source performance
evaluation systems, such as the infamous “rank and
yank” system promoted by General Electric under
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jack Welch has sug13

gested that forced distribution based solely on leader
impressions promotes dysfunctional behavior in an organization. Most significantly, it encourages a culture
in which mid-level leaders seek foremost to cultivate
the loyalty of their superiors, often to the detriment of
loyalty among their subordinates and within creative
teams.31 This discovery explains why many large corporations, most notably Microsoft, have moved away
from this method in recent years.32
A report completed by the Army’s Chief of Staff
Leader Development Task Force in 2013 found, “a
large part of the force is functioning, or perceived by a
large part of the force to be functioning in a command
environment that is not guided by the principles of
mission command.”33 The report recommended educating raters and senior raters on how to use the OER
to evaluate officers on mission command.34 While this
sounds like a simple and straightforward task, the research here shows that top-down, single-source evaluation systems are inherently handicapped in their
ability to evaluate effectively a subordinate’s ability to
conduct mission command.
Another undesirable artifact of a single-source
evaluation system is its tendency to promote functional anonymity in organizations. In 1993, Clinton
Longenecker and Dean Ludwig published a study in
the Journal of Business Ethics on prominent leadership
failures.35 They suggested that unethical and toxic
leader behaviors could be explained best as byproducts of success rather than a response to the stress of
leadership. Borrowing from the biblical story of King
David’s infidelity with the wife of one of his military
officers,36 they described this effect as the “Bathsheba
Syndrome.” Their research suggested that the functional anonymity experienced by leaders with large
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amounts of autonomy was a major risk factor in the
emergence of dysfunctional behaviors. They observed
that detection is the primary factor that deters unethical conduct. They concluded their report with advice
to corporate boards on different techniques for maintaining leader accountability. Their advice included
unannounced audits and the use of ombudsmen to
query employees about organizational climate.37
Research across the talent management field continues to indicate that investments into a rigorous assessment process can yield substantial improvements
in the quality of the workforce. For example, 90 percent of Fortune 1000 companies now include multiple
source assessment tools in their performance evaluation system.38 In addition, a growing number of public
and private organizations employ objective assessment centers to evaluate potential in a wide variety of
skills.39 Successful corporations like General Electric,
International Business Machines, and The Limited
have reoriented their business priorities to focus significant resources on the development of executive
selection and succession management strategies.40
Douglas Bray, author of an exhaustive multidecade
study of human resource practices at American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) came to the conclusion
that, “If you have only one dollar to spend on either
improving the way you develop people or improving
your selection and hiring process, pick the latter.”41
Research by Nowak in 1992 likewise concluded that
organizations that make this investment, employing
an appropriate methodology that accounts for multiple perspectives on performance, tend to realize
significant gains in productivity.42
In the 1990s, Jim Collins and Jerry Porras conducted an exhaustive 6-year study of 18 visionary corpora-
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tions that consistently had outperformed their peers
across multiple business cycles. One of their conclusions was that great corporations focus “first on who,
and then what.”43 They concluded that, in a complex
and changing business world, good talent is more important than good strategy. The results of their study
showed that corporations that invested heavily in talent by studying their leaders in great detail and getting “the right players in the right seats on the bus”44
were the ones that ultimately survived in a chaotic
business environment.
This brief survey of the research in performance
evaluation has shown that top-down, single-source
evaluation methods have a distinct disadvantage in
measuring the internal dynamics of an organization.
In situations where internal climate and culture are a
critical component of organizational success, the literature suggests that a more holistic and resource intensive approach is necessary. With this in mind, it is useful to consider the history of the Army’s performance
evaluation system. This investigation will reveal what
the existing system was originally designed to assess
as it first evolved in the interwar period.
THE HISTORY OF THE ARMY PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION SYSTEM
The Army leadership development model in use
today emerged from the late-19th century Army reforms and proposals made by Major General Emory
Upton. In the 1870s, he conducted an exhaustive
survey of military organization and doctrine in the
armies of France, Germany, England, Persia, China,
and India. Upton identified the primary challenge facing the U.S. Army as the need to create and foster a
profession of arms in a society that had long valued
16

the citizen soldier as the centerpiece of its national security. Borrowing heavily from the models he found
in Prussia, Upton proposed the creation of a standing
general staff, a formal process for officer examination
and promotion, and the creation of a number of professional schools to teach military science. One of the
most important reforms that Upton proposed was the
concept of lineal promotion.45
Since the Revolutionary War, officers had been
generally recruited, assessed, promoted, and retired
within a single regiment. That practice had the advantage of providing senior leaders in each regiment deep
insight into the abilities of the officers in its population. It also fostered rampant parochialism and led to
wide differences in the promotion opportunities in
various regiments. Upton believed that lineal promotion hindered the performance of Union Armies in the
Civil War and inhibited the creation of a professional
army.46 Upton proposed changing the system by reassigning an officer to a different regiment, preferably
in a different part of the country, at each grade in his
career.47 For his plan to work, he knew that the Army
would need to develop a centralized promotion system to replace the regimental system in effect. His
proposed solution was a formal examination process
for company grade officers. A board of officers would
review an officer’s recent fitness reports from superiors and peer evaluations by other officers in his regiment. The board would then administer both an oral
and written exam to the officer.48 In Upton’s model,
then, the ideal way to evaluate officers as they moved
from regiment to regiment was to combine three inputs. These inputs were the standard rater efficiency
report, a peer evaluation, and an objective examination by an outside board. All three inputs would be
considered in the promotion process.
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Unfortunately, Major General Upton underestimated the power of the military bureaus. The bureaus
had held, for almost a century, near exclusive control
over the promotion and selection of officers within
their respective areas of specialty. Many of his other
reforms eventually were adopted by Secretary of War
Elihu Root, following the Army’s disappointing performance in the Spanish-American War. However,
his recommendations regarding a rigorous promotion
board based on both leader and peer evaluation and
formal examination were largely ignored.49
At the same time that Secretary of War Root was
considering Upton’s recommendations, an important
transformation was occurring in American society.
This was the progressive era of American politics, and
the nation was consumed with the optimism that scientific progress could cure social ills and promote the
common welfare. The high confidence in the power of
science led to the application of scientific study to the
fields of both human behavior and business. As the industrial revolution propelled the American workforce
from a collection of cottage industry trade-crafts to a
mass-production society, the field of Human Resource
Management began to emerge as a formal science.50
One of the most influential thinkers in the field
at this time was Frederick Taylor. Taylor began his
working life as a machinist and then a supervisor in
the steel industry, where he observed that most workers did not work as hard as their potential permitted.
In fact, he concluded that most of his peers would operate machinery at the slowest rate that went unpunished by management. In 1913, he published a paper
entitled, “The Principles of Scientific Management,” in
which he argued that production methods could be
optimized and standardized with worker compensa-
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tion directly tied to the achievement of production
goals.51 Taylor’s scientific management theory transformed life in the American factory. Floor managers
subdivided complex tasks into routine and standardized actions. Hyper-specialization allowed factories
to replace skilled artisans with hourly workers who
performed only one or two routine actions at a constant rate over the course of a workday. The result
was the modern assembly line and the explosion in
productivity that came with it.
While Taylor’s methods undoubtedly had a major impact on the ability of the nation’s factories to
generate higher levels of productivity, it had several
negative effects on the nature and structure of the
American workforce. Because of the detailed scientific
study that went into the optimization of each of these
routine tasks, workers were not encouraged to innovate but merely implement established procedures.
Additionally, specialization ensured that hardly anyone in the organization had a full understanding of
the end-to-end process. Effectively integrating the
various work functions performed on the factory floor
required a new breed of middle managers previously
unknown to the manufacturing industry. With very
clear standards of performance, a manager could patrol the factory floor and assess the performance and
relative value of his workers based on their ability to
meet production quotas while adhering to established
procedures. Since the procedures required little exercise in judgment at the operator level, workers essentially became interchangeable parts in the machinery
of the factory and could be retooled from one task to
another in order to optimize productivity.52
Donald Vandergriff has argued in Path to Victory that the success of “Taylorism” had a profound
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effect on the ongoing efforts to professionalize the military.53 In particular, the theory of scientific management heavily influenced Secretary of War Root as he
attempted to implement many of Upton’s proposals.
One of the most obvious influences was the centralization of personnel functions at the Army staff level.54 In
the National Defense Act of 1920, Congress mandated
sweeping reforms to the organization of the Army,
creating a peacetime General Staff with a centralized
office for personnel management and establishing a
centralized promotion list for each grade. This greatly
reduced the power of the bureaus to control the promotion of their officers. It also eliminated the perennial infighting among various bureaus competing for
promotion quotas. The Act also sought to preserve the
expansibility of the Army by maintaining an activeduty force of 17,726 commissioned officers—three
times the pre-war number.55
To handle the vast responsibility of managing
the performance evaluation records for such a large
population of officers, the newly formed General Staff
created the Personnel Office. Employing Taylor’s
management theory, the Army Personnel office established a standardized method for assembling the
promotion list based on time in service and medical
fitness. Like cogs in a vast machine, all officers with
equivalent time in service and shown to be fit for duty
by a medical panel were deemed equally deserving
of promotion. It is worth noting that the Army maintained a formalized system of routine performance
evaluation during this period with fitness reports that,
at one point, stretched to 24 pages.56 Despite the exceptional detail of these reports, they appeared to play
only a minor role in the promotion of officers.
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The centralized promotion board process that
emerged from the Defense Act of 1920 was designed
primarily to examine officer records to identify any
disqualifying trait rather than identify the very best
qualified officer. Those early boards generally consisted of three officers chosen from different bureaus,
along with two medical officers. While the bureau officers did apply some judgment to the review process,
their primary purpose on the board was to represent
the parochial interests of their bureau.57
This history is important because it provides insight into how the Army melded a cultural aversion to
self-promotion and a respect for long and honorable
service with the principles of scientific management
emerging in the business community. The result was
the centralized promotion board process that is still
in place today. The Army of the interwar period employed merit as a basis for retention rather than promotion, and culled only the least desirable from the
profession. Seniority and honorable service were seen
as the primary basis for promotion to higher rank. This
attitude reflects Taylor’s classic principles because it
assumed that the best a worker can achieve is to meet
the standards of his assigned task. Those that did
were rewarded with promotion in due course, while
those that failed to meet the minimum standard were
eliminated.
Herein lies the crux of so much frustration among
junior officers today. The Army has sought to incorporate some element of Auftragstaktik into its warfighting
doctrine at least since the publication of Field Manual
(FM) 100-5 in 1941.58
The officer manning and promotion system, however, fights against this aspiration because it was constructed on a fundamentally different organizational
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concept. This concept is founded on Taylor’s vision of
a commoditized labor pool. This model may have had
some utility in conflicts where extremely high casualty rates demanded a near continuous churn of small
unit leaders. More recent experience has shown that
small unit leaders on the modern battlefield are highly
specialized individuals who must exercise broad judgment in unstructured and unpredictable situations.
This operational ethos, founded on the experience of
the modern battlefield, diverges from an institutional
one founded on the practices of a managerial philosophy that still regards Army leaders as interchangeable
parts. The result of this clash of ethos is a cognitive
dissonance within the officer corps that pits the Army’s leader development strategy against the historical legacy of its manning and personnel structure.
SYMPTOMS OF A FAILING SYSTEM
The evidence of our discussion thus far has established three compelling conclusions: First, a philosophy of mission command demands an increased
emphasis on a unique set of organizational dynamics centered on the concept of mutual trust. Second,
research across the field of performance management
has shown that single-source evaluation methods are
poorly suited to assess a leader’s ability to create the
unique environment necessary for mission command.
Third, the Army performance evaluation system, along
with its personnel system, emerged as derivatives of
a corporate management philosophy that sought to
maximize efficiency by regarding small unit leaders as
interchangeable parts of the military machine. These
three conclusions strongly suggest that the Army performance evaluation system will struggle to assess
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leaders on their exercise of mission command. The next
step, then, is to evaluate the Army’s own recent research
into the effectiveness of its performance evaluation
to look for symptoms of the difficulties predicted by
these conclusions.
In June 2013, the Army Leader Development Task
Force published its most exhaustive study yet of leadership attitudes across the Army. The study based
its findings on detailed interviews with over 550 officers ranking from lieutenant to colonel and over
12,000 responses to an Army-wide survey. One of the
study’s most surprising findings was that only about
half of Army leaders believe personnel evaluations
and promotion decisions are accurate.59 Additionally,
19 percent of survey respondents claimed that they
never received performance counseling, even though
performance counseling is a mandatory component
of the Officer Evaluation System and the centerpiece
of the Army’s performance appraisal system. A separate survey of 250 West Point graduates, both inside
and outside the military, found that only 30 percent
believed that the Army does a good job promoting the
right officers.60 A full 78 percent believed that this failure has a direct and negative impact on our national
security.61
Not only does the current evaluation system undermine confidence in the efficacy of Army promotion
decisions, it also engenders dysfunctional behaviors
in the officer corps as ambitious officers seek to game
the system. A recent review of selectees for infantry
battalion command showed an average of 36 months
of field grade key and developmental (KD) time. This
is a significant departure from the 24 months typically
expected of officers at this grade. Since performance
in KD assignments is weighted heavier than perfor-
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mance in other broadening assignments, officers
naturally expect that their reports will receive special
attention from their senior raters while they occupy
these choice assignments. The key to gaming the system is to maximize the time spent in KD assignments
since they enjoy a special advantage over those within
the senior rater’s pool who are not in these positions.
Additionally, not all senior raters are created equal. A
senior rater with a broad profile of Army officers and
a wide reputation across the Army is considered better than one working in a small niche organization, or
worse, a joint officer from another service.
The net effect has been to discourage talented officers from pursuing truly broadening assignments in
the joint community or unique staff positions where
the population of peer Army officers is necessarily
limited. For example, the most common broadening
assignment for infantry battalion command selectees
in 2012 was the position of aide-de-camp to a General
officer.62 Examined purely based on promotion board
results, the most valuable service that an officer can
provide outside of KD or command duty is to serve as
an aide to a senior leader.
Empirical evidence also suggests that the writing
skill of the rater on an OER often carries nearly equal
weight to the merit of the officer being rated. A 2013
study of over 4,000 Army officers revealed a surprising
correlation between rater and rated officer promotion
rates. The study showed that company commanders
stood a 29 percent greater likelihood of promotion below the zone to major if they served under a battalion
commander who was likewise promoted below the
zone to major.63 While this evidence can suggest that
effective mentorship by a high-performing leader provides an officer with a strong competitive advantage,
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a different interpretation of the data is also possible.
Promotion below the zone to major is based heavily
on the strength of officer evaluation reports written
during company command. The previous data suggests that an officer who has the good fortune to serve
under a high-performing mentor during this critical
period may benefit from the increased proficiency
of the mentor’s writing and the increased opportunity for the mentor to advocate for the officer to his
senior rater. The significant difference in promotion
rates found in the study confirms one of the primary
criticisms of single-source evaluation techniques. The
quality of the report is often as much an assessment of
the report’s author as its subject.
In addition, surveys within and outside the Army
repeatedly have suggested that the single-source approach to performance evaluation is a leading cause
for talented junior officers to depart the military.64 A
2,000 Army Research Institute Study on captain attrition interviewed 161 students of the Combined Arms
Staff School and found that eight of the 20 factors most
likely to cause officers to resign their commission were
related directly to the structure of the performance
evaluation system and its perceived effects.65 A similar study by the Army Training and Leader Development Panel conducted that same year concluded that
junior officers observed, “diminishing direct contact
between seniors and subordinates . . . evidenced by
leaders that are focused up rather than down.”66 They
also cited “the OER as a source of mistrust and anxiety.”67 In addition to these challenges, evidence continues to mount that senior leaders, no matter how capable, struggle to detect evidence of toxic leadership
within their subordinate commands.
In 2010, the Navy conducted an exhaustive investigation into all 80 incidents in which a field grade level
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commander was relieved for cause in the preceding
5-year period. Only 11 of these incidents were attributed directly to a toxic or dysfunctional command climate in the organization. In all but one of these cases,
however, the relief came because of pressure from an
external agent such as the Navy Inspector General or
Congress. The commander’s direct supervisor identified and took action in only a single incident. The
study concluded that in 10 of 11 cases, the toxic behaviors that led to the relief were invisible to the superior
officer charged with evaluating the leader.68
This evidence is reinforced by two recent studies
on toxic leadership at the U.S. Army War College in
2003 and the Command and General Staff College in
2009. Both studies concluded that the vast majority of
toxic leader behavior was essentially invisible to those
in positions of authority over the leader in question.69
In view of these findings, the authors of the study
recommended to the Secretary of the Army that the
supervisor centric leader evaluation process be augmented with input from peers and subordinates.70 This
additional information, while not superior to a senior
leader’s evaluation of his subordinate leaders, would
serve as a hedge against the harmful consequences of
the halo effect. The Army’s emphasis on performance
as evaluated by a distant superior presents a moral
hazard to an aspiring officer by placing him in a situation where his self-interest demands he focus his attention up the chain of command while his concept of
duty demands that he focus downward. Recognizing
that the vast majority of his leadership behavior will
go unobserved and unevaluated, a purely self-interested officer has great incentive to script and shape
engagements to produce a desired illusion at the expense of the long-term health of the outfit he leads.
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The Curious Case of Major General Lloyd
Fredendall.
History provides a powerful example of the limited ability of any leader to accurately assess the internal dynamics of subordinate formations. In 1943,
Major General Lloyd Fredendall, then Commander of
U.S. II Corps, was assigned to lead his Corps into the
Army’s first major battle in the European theater. In
an Army so focused on leader development and so full
of promising officers at the time, Fredendall proved a
curious choice to lead such an important command.
Kicked out of West Point twice for poor grades and
possessing very limited World War I combat experience, Fredendall had a terrible reputation as a harsh
disciplinarian, a detached leader, and an uncooperative partner. General George Marshall, however, was
impressed by Fredendall when Fredendall was an instructor at the Infantry School at Ft. Benning, GA. As
a result, Marshall encouraged General Dwight Eisenhower to place him in command.71 In February 1943,
as II Corps occupied positions in the Atlas mountain
range of Tunisia, Fredendall quickly lived up to his
reputation. He alienated both his French and British
allies as well as his subordinate commanders with a
mixture of confusing and conflicting guidance to his
division commanders and was nearly insubordinate
to the British First Army commander. He directed
his most capable fighting formation, the 1st Armored
Division, to dissipate its strength in small packets of
combat power across a wide front.72 Perhaps most
puzzling was his directive, issued from his command
bunker almost 100 miles from the front, for the 168th
Regimental Combat Team to divide its combat power
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on two isolated hilltops near a potential axis of enemy
advance.
The night before the German attack, Eisenhower
toured the front lines with the 1st Armored Division
commander, Major General Orlando Ward. Ward
was deeply concerned with the defensive dispositions directed by Fredendall but declined to express
his reservations directly to Eisenhower. Eisenhower
left believing all was well. That evening, only hours
before the disastrous battle, Eisenhower sent a note
to Marshall that he was impressed with Fredendall’s
“thorough knowledge of his battlefront,” adding that,
“he seems keen and fit and I am placing a lot of confidence in him.”73
When Rommel’s forces struck on February 14,
the results were both predictable and tragic. The two
infantry battalions defending the high ground were
rapidly isolated and overwhelmed. With most of the
armored forces spread across the Corps front, counterattacks were piecemeal and ineffective. By the end of
the first day, U.S. forces were in full retreat in the face
of the German combined arms onslaught, with nearly
all of the Corp’s tanks and over 1,000 lives lost. Fredendall’s behavior during the battle was as puzzling
as his preparations. When Eisenhower sent forward
his deputy, Major General Ernest Harmon, to assess
the state of the command, Fredendall handed over the
command of the battle to him and quickly retired to
his quarters. As the Kasserine Pass fell on February
20, Fredendall became increasingly despondent and
was observed sitting on a crate sipping bourbon with
his head in his hands focused on who would bear the
blame for the tragedy.74 Eisenhower, despite traveling
through the Corps area only hours before the fight
had been unable to observe the toxic climate developing among the senior leaders of II Corps.
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Leaders do not arrive on the battlefield as an accident of history. Today’s professional military officers come to lead large formations in combat only
after successfully navigating a complex institutional
bureaucracy that both shapes them and selects them
from a large pool of talented peers. Their behavior in
command is not an accident of chance but rather the
specific and deliberate choice of an institution whose
very purpose is to ensure they possess the skills to
succeed. When a leader such as Fredendall so significantly departs from the stated behaviors encouraged
by that institution at such a consequential moment, it
demands investigation into the process that selected
him for the enormous responsibility he bore.
In 1943 the U.S. Army was brimming with talented
leaders. Both George Patton and Omar Bradley waited
patiently in Casablanca for their shot at command.
The Operations Field Manual 100-5 published 2 years
earlier borrowed heavily from the Prussian Auftragstaktik concept and emphasized decentralized mission
type orders based on trust between commanders.75
This command philosophy, however, did not materialize on the battlefield of Tunisia where it might have
served the II Corps well. It failed to emerge because
the Army at the time did not fully integrate its warfighting philosophy with its leader selection and performance evaluation policies. Fredendall’s shortcomings were not a failure of doctrine or of the Army’s
leader development program at the time. The failure
lay in the process of leader appraisal and selection.
It was this faulty process that allowed two of the nation’s finest strategists, Eisenhower and Marshall, to
select a man who was manifestly unprepared for the
task to lead the nation’s first major battle against the
armies of Adolf Hitler.
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Fredendall’s unfortunate story suggests that even
the very best senior leaders struggle to gain an accurate assessment of their subordinates as leaders.
It also suggests that a leader, widely regarded as incompetent by those in his organization, is still able to
stage-manage his interactions with senior leaders in
such a way as to create and maintain an illusion of
competence. While history largely has forgotten Fredendall, his tragic story provides a powerful lesson
for a military that must continue to prepare for the
unexpected and identify talented leaders to command
our formations under conditions of incredible stress
and uncertainty. Unfortunately, this Fredendall syndrome continues to plague the Army today because
we have not adequately addressed its root cause. Specifically, the Army has failed to provide a systematic
means for a senior leader to augment his own subjective judgment about his subordinates with a more objective evaluation of their individual abilities. Army
leaders are asked to make tremendously important
leadership selection decisions based on very limited
subjective information gathered from infrequent interactions with subordinates. Not only does this fact
lead to suboptimal leader selection decisions, but also
more importantly fosters an environment where external measures of performance outweigh effective
organizational leadership. This environment directly
threatens the creation of a culture of mission command across the force.
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
Having examined the shortcomings in the Army’s
approach, it is useful now to consider alternatives
from the business community and the public sector
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that may better serve the goal of identifying and selecting mission command behaviors. In 1990, Lex Wexner
was one of the most successful business leaders in
America. As the founder of the retail chain The Limited, he had witnessed his business grow from nothing
in 1963 to over 3,800 stores and $5 billion in sales. In
the early-1990s, The Limited’s stock price plummeted.
Puzzled by this sudden turn of events, Wexner sought
the advice of some of the brightest CEOs in business,
specifically Steven Spielberg and Jack Welch. What he
observed in both of these leaders was a detachment
from the day-to-day dramas of the business cycle and
an obsession with the identification, selection, and development of the best and brightest leaders in their
organization. Both leaders had multiple overlapping
systems for assessing and evaluating their best talent
and invested a large percentage of their personal and
organizational capital into their hiring and promotion processes. Wexner returned to his company and
immediately set out transforming his talent management system. He hired outside consultants to evaluate his leaders and instituted a process requiring each
division to track its top 50 employees. Wexner began
chairing his own talent review process. Over time, his
stock slide arrested, and then rebounded. Wexner observed, “I used to pick sweaters; now I pick people.”76
The Army’s mission and culture are radically different from a clothing retailer so there is a danger in
drawing too many parallels from Wexner’s experience. On the other hand, a careful review of talent
management literature reveals some consistent best
practices from successful corporations that diverge
from the Army’s approach. To better understand
how the Army evaluation practices compare with the
best practices of the personnel assessment field, the
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research examined the talent management processes
at several large and successful private corporation and
a major public sector enterprise. These institutions
face unique circumstances and cultural imperatives
but share the same challenge to assess and manage
their talent in a way that optimizes performance and
organizational stability.
Example #1: Data-Rich Talent Management
at International Business Machines.
In 2011, Fortune magazine conducted a detailed
review of 470 global companies to determine which
ones best recruited, developed, and retained talent.
Fortune ranked International Business Machines (IBM)
as the top corporation out of all 470 in this list.77 With
just under 400,000 employees, IBM is only slightly
smaller than the total Army active duty population.
Compared to the Army, the company offers a radically different approach to evaluating and selecting
leaders in the organization. Most notably, IBM invests
a significantly larger level of institutional energy into
the study and evaluation of its mid-level managers.
Instead of relying solely on the annual performance
review common in large corporations, IBM pulls data
from across the company to develop a holistic picture
of its managers. The corporation maintains detailed
reports on managers, to include personality assessments, peer reviews, objective performance metrics,
and records of developmental experience. IBM’s data
analysis is not just confined to senior executives but
extends deep into the organization including its top
50,000 employees.78 Additionally, IBM specifically
tracks employee retention rates as a key measure of
manager performance evaluation.79
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IBM uses the collected data to inform compensation plans based on a forced ranking of employees
within job categories. It also uses the data to map out
succession planning strategies for key assignments
within the organization. This rich data pool provides
a deep reservoir of information from which to draw
conclusions about talent management decisions. Furthermore, the extensive database of peer and subordinate evaluations coupled with standard performance
metrics allow managers to predict the likely impact
of personnel decisions on the organizational dynamics of their subordinate teams. The data rich process is
the heart and soul of the IBM leadership philosophy.
As a senior IBM executive commented:
We couldn’t get good business results without good
leadership. We employ a heavily data-driven talent
review process using a leadership talent database that
has dozens of metrics on leaders. We use it heavily all
year long to access detailed facts on people, experiences, potential, development scores, assessment center,
performance, etc. We look at empirically based business results and review feedback on leadership approaches and facts about their leadership approaches
(e.g., number of mentees, talent they’ve exported, talent audits, and climate).80

There is no empirical way to demonstrate that IBM’s
rich data model is superior to the Army’s centralized
board process. However, the fact that IBM bases personnel decisions on a broad spectrum of complementary inputs on leadership performance suggests that
it may have a better sense of how leaders impact the
internal dynamics of the teams that they lead.
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Example #2: Peer Evaluations at CEMEX UK.
A much smaller corporation, CEMEX UK, is notable in the field of performance evaluation for being
one of the early adopters of formalized 360-degree
performance evaluations for use in succession management decisions. CEMEX UK is the British subsidiary of a large building materials company headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico. With just over 4,000
employees CEMEX UK is 1 1/100th the size of IBM.
Each year, every staff member is required to select up
to six persons to complete their evaluations. At a minimum, this must include one peer, one internal supplier, and one external supplier. The rated individual’s
supervisor must approve the pool prior to the start of
the assessment. What is notable in this method is the
design of the assessment tool. The peer and customer
evaluations are narrowly focused on those behaviors
and dynamics assumed to be invisible to the supervisor, such as group dynamics and customer relations.81
The intent of the evaluation is not to provide a second
opinion of the supervisor’s assessment but a complementary review focused specifically on those behaviors invisible from the top. As a result the CEMEX
method serves as an effective complement to the blind
spots inherent in top-down, single-source evaluation
systems.
Like most large corporations, salary at CEMEX
UK is based largely on organizational output while
the results of the 360-degree reviews serve primarily
to inform succession management decisions.82 This is
a second important insight. Focusing the 360-degree
reviews on succession management decisions rather
than salary minimizes the temptation by peers to
overinflate reports but ensures that senior manage-
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ment has a three dimensional view of those leaders
that have otherwise shown a potential for greater responsibility in the company. The CEMEX UK experience offers two insights that should inform the search
for alternate models in the Army. The first is that peer
and subordinate feedback should remain focused on
behaviors considered invisible to the primary evaluator. The second insight is that 360-degree assessments
appear more useful for informing succession management decisions than those related to promotion or
retention. The CEMEX UK model demonstrates that
top-down performance reviews and peer evaluations
can work together if they are carefully designed to
serve complementary rather than redundant roles.
Example #3: Assessment Centers at Municipal Fire
Departments in the Southeastern United States.
The two examples thus far have examined alternative ways to assess organizational dynamics
through broader inputs. In contrast, the final example
illustrates a second important component of mission
command defined earlier. A culture of trust can best
exist in an environment where technical competence
is assured through a rigorous certification process.
Trusting untrained amateurs to execute complex tasks
is a formula for disaster rather than excellence. Most
professions have, therefore, sought to protect their autonomy by imposing rigorous certification standards
for each successive level of the profession. These standards serve as gate keepers to prevent amateur practitioners from undermining public or organizational
trust in the certified members of the profession.
Assessment centers serve the same certification role
by providing an objective outsider an opportunity to
thoroughly validate a candidate’s potential to demon35

strate the skills and abilities needed at the next level of
the profession. The concept of the modern assessment
center emerged in the 1950s with the AT&T Management Study. The AT&T study assessed the ability of
137 college graduate applicants to Bell subsidiaries
to perform a series of oral, written and situational exercises. The study then used applicant performance
to predict the likelihood they would achieve different levels of leadership within the company’s seventiered hierarchy. Without revealing any information
to the applicants or management, the research team
then followed these employees for the next 20 years
as they progressed through the company. The results
of the assessment proved surprisingly accurate with a
moderate correlation (p= 0.37) between predicted and
observed results.83 Since that time, assessment center
researchers have refined their techniques to produce
highly accurate results.
Because of their need for sound decisionmaking in
complex and ambiguous situations, many fire departments across the country increasingly have relied on
the assessment center as a form of performance evaluation both for initial entry candidates and for positions
up to and including senior management. Since assessment centers are designed to measure future potential
more than current competence, they are most often
used at career inflection points. For example, a senior
firefighter seeking the position of station fire chief
must undergo testing at an assessment center. The
testing includes a number of tests such as an “in-box”
exercise where candidates must rapidly prioritize a
number of simultaneous tasks. Other testing includes
mock tactical scenarios and written tests on legal
procedures. Two independent evaluators score each
exam. Results are normalized and then forwarded to
the fire chief selection board.84
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The Orange County Fire Department in Central
Florida has employed this assessment center method
to aid in the selection of mid-grade leaders for several
years. With just under 900 full-time employees and
approximately 69,000 service calls per year, this department is about the size of a large Army battalion.
In 2000, the department conducted a detailed survey
of its performance appraisal system to determine if
the reliance on external assessment centers was a worthy investment.85 The study also solicited feedback
from 48 other metropolitan fire departments spread
across the southeastern United States. The research
concluded that use of assessment centers improved
fire department hiring and promotion decisions. This
resulted in a general decrease in performance-based
terminations. Additionally, the use of an external assessment center was shown to reduce legal protests
of management decisions and to reduce the effectiveness of those protests when they did occur.86 Simply
put, the data suggests that most firefighters regarded
the assessment process as a fair, nonpolitical, and
objective evaluation of their abilities. The result was
a growth in confidence in the talent management
system within the organization.
It is interesting to note that a large cottage industry has developed around helping firemen to prepare
for and to pass these challenging exercises. Numerous businesses offer study guides and practical exercises to help candidates prepare. Thus, the effect of the
move toward assessment centers in the fire prevention
industry is the gradual professionalization of the field.
The examination of the three civilian personnel
evaluation practices here indicate that alternate performance evaluation systems may be better suited to
evaluating leadership in a mission command environ-

37

ment than the system currently in place in the Army.
The examples also suggest that the Army’s search for
an alternative performance evaluation system should
begin by considering a mix of these practices. These
may include 360-degree evaluations from peers and
subordinates, objective testing at career inflection
points, and a broader database on individual performance metrics beyond the OER.
LEGAL AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES
TO IMPLEMENTATION
An Army Times article published in October 2013
suggested that, while the Army might want to adopt
a 360-degree performance appraisal system, current
legal roadblocks rule this out.87 An examination of the
policy documents governing military promotions indicates that this concern is unfounded. The Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980
established the modern process of performance assessment in the military. Among many other reforms, that
Act established the “up or out” promotion system. In
the up or out system, officers twice not selected for
promotion are subject to separation from the Service.
In addition, the Act mandated fixed ceilings for field
grade strengths and formalized the centralized promotion board procedures.88 While a detailed discussion
of DOPMA and its effects is beyond the scope of this
research, a basic understanding of the Act is necessary
to appreciate the legal framework of the performance
appraisal process.
Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1320.14 is
the regulatory guideline that governs the conduct of
centralized Army promotion boards and summarizes
the statutory parameters established by DOPMA and

38

other sources. The instructions exhort board members
to ensure the sanctity of the process by considering
“all eligible officers without prejudice or partiality.”89
Additionally, Section 2c(2)(c) specifies that the Secretary of the Army may designate for consideration
by the board “substantiated and relevant information
that he or she considers might reasonably and materially affect the deliberations of the promotion selection board” only if that information is provided for
all officers considered. The section also stipulates that
the officer must be afforded the opportunity to see
this information and submit written comments relevant to its content. Current policy, therefore, does not
preclude the use of alternate feedback tools in board
proceedings as long as all eligible promotion board
candidates are subject to the same evaluation and are
afforded an opportunity to review and appeal any results.90 Beyond these two requirements no other legal
obstacle prevents the use of 360-degree feedback in
either promotion or selection boards.
Allan Mohrman, Susan Resnick-West, and Edward
Lawler conducted a detailed review of legal considerations in the civilian world for the implementation of
360-degree performance evaluation tools. As a result
of their research, they developed four guidelines to
help companies avoid legal challenges to this method
of evaluation: First, companies should carefully define
the behaviors that the tool is intended to measure and
then ensure that the tool’s design strictly follows that
intent. Second, the evaluation process should remain
confined to those behaviors that the rater population
is qualified to evaluate. For example, it would be inappropriate for entry-level employees to evaluate a
manager on business strategy if they have no formal
training in this area. On the contrary, the tool should
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evaluate the leader on those behaviors that the rater
can directly observe and reasonably judge. Third, to
eliminate discrimination, the process should include
an objective audit by an outside party to ensure that
evaluations remain oriented specifically on work related behaviors. Finally, the data should be open to
the rated employee and provide a mechanism for
appeal.91
An effective multisource assessment tool must
balance two competing and potentially contradictory
concerns. The first is the requirement to protect the
anonymity of the subordinate rater to ensure candid
evaluations and mitigate the possibility of retribution.
The second concern is to protect the legal right of the
rated officer, explicitly guaranteed in DoDI 1320.14, to
review data used in his own performance evaluation
and appeal that data if he believes it to be substantially false. Balancing these two concerns requires a
creative approach to data collection so that the act of
collecting feedback does not undermine the integrity
of the chain of command. A potential solution to this
dilemma is proposed in the appendix to this research.
The examination of both DoD policy and relevant
experience above indicates that the legal challenges
to implementing a multisource assessment tool are
not insurmountable. Instead, current policy allows
for centralized promotion boards to consider substantiated performance data from sources other than
supervisors so long as similar data is available on all
candidates. The challenge, then, is designing a methodology that provides the candidate officer free access
to the data but preserves the anonymity of the source
in order to prevent both retribution and inflation.
In addition to legal obstacles, research on multisource assessment methods provides many cautions
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on the often unanticipated cultural hazards of using
an assessment tool designed for employee self-development for evaluation.92 Many organizations report
unfavorable results during the initial implementation
of peer and subordinate evaluations due to poor execution, instrument design, or lack of executive buy-in.
A detailed examination of these hazards will inform a
discussion of how the Army could incorporate multisource feedback into performance evaluation.
In 1998, research by Clive Fletcher of the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University
of London, UK, noted a growing trend in the 1990s
among organizations to graft 360-degree development programs onto their existing performance evaluation systems in order to combat perceived bias in
top-down appraisal systems. He also noted that, while
these programs often were effective in providing access to subordinate behaviors that were otherwise invisible to senior management, there were risks. Most
notably, he observed that the candor of 360-degreeevaluations was often diminished as existing developmental tools were adapted for appraisal purposes.
Specifically, his research indicated that 35 percent
of respondents would change their assessment of a
peer if they believed the information would be used
for evaluation rather than self-development.93 Maury
Pieperl has studied the effects of peer evaluation in 17
different organizations and noted the paradox inherent in asking co-workers and subordinates to serve as
both a helpful coach and a hard-nosed judge.94 Considerable research into the actual practice of peer and
subordinate evaluation outside the military suggests
that the use of assessment tools originally intended
for developmental purposes can lead to unintended
consequences. The better alternative would be a sepa-
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rate program that places a seasoned and experienced
interviewer between the rater and rated officer.
Tracey Mallett has demonstrated that the overwhelming weight of scholarship on the subject suggests that the mixing of multi-source tools for development and performance evaluation can lead to
difficulty in practical implementation.95 This conclusion is echoed in a 2012 study of the Navy’s pilot multisource development program named SMARTS360.
Like the Army’s Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback forum (MSAF), SMARTS360 is an online database
where leaders can nominate peers and subordinates
to evaluate their leadership styles. The program was
discontinued after 3 years in large part because Navy
senior leaders suggested that some of the feedback
provided may eventually be used to inform leader selection decisions. The study noted a significant decline
in voluntary participation after this announcement.96
These findings suggest that any 360-degree evaluation
program used by the Army should remain separate
and distinct from existing programs such as the MSAF
that seek to use peer and subordinated feedback for
leader development.
CONCLUSIONS
Both the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Defense are seeking a change to the way the Army selects
leaders. Exhaustive survey data from the force suggests that such a change is long overdue. The research
here demonstrates that the Army performance evaluation system, as it is currently designed, is ill-suited
to evaluate and select leaders best adapted to mission
command. This does not mean that leaders selected
under the current system are incapable of effective
mission command. It merely implies that the system
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is not optimized to find those leaders who execute the
style of command most prized by the Army.
Because mission command requires a culture of
trust, effective practitioners must possess the competence to deliver what is expected of them and the moral capacity to be both worthy of trust and willing to
trust in others. Evaluating a leader’s ability to trust his
subordinates requires more than just an OER. Many
other researchers have come to this same conclusion.
For example, Colonel Tim Reese observed in a paper in
2002 that “the OER simply does not provide the Army
an evaluation of an officer’s ability to lead a unit or
organization in a way that fosters cohesion, teamwork
and long-term health of the unit.”97 The review of the
Prussian military experience has shown that previous
attempts to inculcate a mission command philosophy
required a fundamental change to the way officers
were certified for their commands and a closer look at
the impact they had on unit climate through subordinate evaluations.
The review of the history of the centralized promotion system showed how Upton’s early attempts to
bring Auftragstaktik into the U.S. military were sidetracked by a corporate managerial philosophy that
optimized efficiency above all. This philosophy saw
leaders as interchangeable cogs producing measurable
outputs rather than the architects of a subjective unit
climate conducive to bold initiative. While Auftragstaktik has slowly entered Army doctrine, the vestiges
of Taylorism remain in the personnel and promotion
system. This system evaluates officer potential based
on an extremely narrow slice of overall performance in
an effort to mass-produce promotion decisions across
a large formation with minimal investment.
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The example of Fredendall and the more recent
data presented earlier cautions that the current system
of top-down evaluation does not detect and, therefore,
cannot screen for toxicity within subordinate organizations. This evidence suggests that, absent a fundamental change to the way officers are evaluated and
selected, toxic leaders will continue to make their way
into positions of tremendous influence where they
will do great harm to the soldiers they lead. A true
commitment to the mission command philosophy
requires more than just a change in doctrine. Colonel
Tom Guthrie posed this challenge in an article in Army
Magazine:
If we intend to truly embrace mission command, then
we should do it to the fullest, and that will require
commitment to changing a culture from one of control
and process to one of decentralization and trust. We
cannot afford to preach one thing and do another.98

To develop a new model requires first the development of a new perspective. A detailed examination of
best practices in the field of talent management has
provided that perspective. It suggests that the Army
could improve the exercise of mission command if
it provided a greater investment into its talent management system. This investment should include a
broader set of perspectives into leader performance.
Multisource performance evaluation methods have
worked well in organizations of similar size, and the
data suggests that they might succeed in the Army if
properly implemented.
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that performance evaluation systems have a profound effect
on organizational culture. To move from a results
oriented culture to a process oriented one requires
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a change to the way the Army evaluates its leaders.
Augmenting the supervisor-centric evaluation process with input from peers and subordinates may
help to eliminate the functional anonymity that has allowed a few leaders to develop destructive Bathsheba
Syndrome behaviors that have so damaged the Army’s prestige. It will also promote greater trust in the
system by providing another venue for professional
accountability.
Professional athletes, real estate agents, doctors,
and lawyers all must undergo a rigorous and objective assessment of their abilities in order to enter and
then continue in their careers. This accreditation process is foundational to the very idea of professionalism as the life-long pursuit and exercise of a body of
expert knowledge.99 The use of assessment centers in
the business world and the public service sector have
been shown to improve confidence in talent management decisions and accurately predict those who are
best able to transition to new levels of management.
Providing an equally rigorous assessment process in
the Army might provide another effective tool for
commanders and boards to evaluate potential.
The research presented in this monograph has
shown that the current Army top-down performance
evaluation system lacks the capacity to evaluate effectively the practice of mission command embodied in Army doctrine. Research across the field of
performance assessment has shown that multisource
ratings remain the most effective means for providing a nuanced three-dimensional view of the performance necessary for effective succession management
decisions.100 This is supported by the examination of
best practices in the field of talent management. The
research indicates that expanding the Army perfor-
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mance evaluation system to include alternate perspectives of leader performance may improve internal
organization dynamics. The data also suggests that
a multisource approach will specifically target two
contemporary problems facing the Army: First is the
growing lack of faith in the fairness of the performance
evaluation process. Second is the functional anonymity of small unit leaders that has been shown to contribute to the “Bathsheba Syndrome” effects described
earlier. This evidence provides a compelling argument
for a significant change in the way the Army evaluates
the performance of its leaders.
When future historians study the Army of the early-21st century, they will no doubt take considerable
interest in the way the Army transformed itself in the
post-war period following the conclusion of wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Parallels will abound between
this period and a similar one a century earlier when
the Army withdrew from its expeditionary stance and
downsized in the face of extreme financial austerity.
How the Army manages this transition will have a
decisive impact on the future conflicts of the 21st century that are sure to come. While the outline of those
conflicts is difficult to discern, we do know that war
in the information age demands a highly skilled and
professional force officered by a very talented cadre
of agile and adaptive leaders. These leaders must be
able to exercise initiative based on a culture of trust
that runs up and down the chain of command. The
challenge is not predicting the exact shape of future
conflicts but ensuring that we have the right talent on
board and ready to adapt when that shape emerges.
Retaining and promoting the very best demands that
the Army abandon the industrial age procedures of
performance appraisal and embrace a new level of
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organizational investment in its people. If people are
the centerpiece of the Army, then the Army must study
them in great detail. Promoting a culture of mission
command demands that the Army as an institution focus its energies on the exhaustive study of the quality
and character of its men and women, not merely on
the outputs of their labor.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSALS SUGGESTED BY THE RESEARCH
The research has established that the Army model
of performance evaluation was not designed to assess
a leader’s mission command attributes and cannot easily be adapted to make that assessment. It has also established that alternative models in use in the civilian
world hold the potential to address this shortcoming
but only if they are carefully implemented. Dramatic
change to the performance evaluation system in an organization can often do more harm than good. While
any change to the promotion and selection board process should involve careful evaluation and pilot testing, the research suggests that two specific proposals
may hold promise as a basis for a future study.
Proposal #1: Formal Investigations for Candidates
to be Considered by Leadership Boards.
The uneven performance of peer reviews warns the
Army to move cautiously if it seeks to include 360-degree subjective reviews in Army selection board files.
The evidence shown earlier has established that effective 360-degree appraisal should adhere to four guidelines: First, it should be separate and distinct from any
developmental tools such as the Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF). Second, it should be
focused narrowly on the behaviors that subordinates
are qualified to assess. Third, it should protect the
privacy of the evaluator while respecting the rights of
the evaluated officer. Fourth, an effective 360-degree
performance appraisal is best used as a tool for succession management rather than routine promotion.
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An implementation strategy that respects these guidelines and yet provides an effective tool for selection
boards will not be easy or inexpensive to design.
In 2013, the Chief of Staff’s Leader Development
Task Force recommended examining 360-degree feedback already compiled in the existing MSAF database
for use in the selection of Brigade Commanders.1
While this recommendation suggests senior officer
enthusiasm for 360-degree appraisal methods, the
specific implementation strategy is flawed for the reasons outlined earlier. The MSAF available today has
been sold from its inception as a developmental tool
only. For almost a decade, the Army has assured both
recipients and evaluators that the data they submit
is purely confidential for the benefit of the recipient.
Any attempt to open that database to wider scrutiny,
no matter how carefully done, has the potential to
appear as a breach of trust.
The Center for Army Leadership is currently exploring a program called “Commander 360” that will
require subordinates to appraise battalion and brigade
commanders during their first and last six months of
command.2 Set to roll out in pilot form in 2014, these
feedback reports will take the form of online queries
derived from randomly selected subordinate leaders
in the organization. The evaluated commander’s rater
and senior rater would then have access to the results.3
Even though the results of the survey will go directly
to the officer’s chain of command, Army leadership
argues that Commander 360 is intended primarily as
a developmental tool.4 Senior officers would presumably use the 360-degree feedback when counseling the
officer in question.
While Commander 360 will remain wholly separate from the MSAF program, the experience of the
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Navy provides cautionary insight. The Commander
360 concept runs the risk of confusing assessment and
development as the Navy did in their SMARTS360
program.5 Since the authors of the feedback are still
in the organization, it will be difficult to protect their
identity in any meaningful way. The likely effect of
this risk will be to dampen the candor of assessments
given in Commander 360. In an extreme case, a form
of quid pro quo may emerge whereby subordinates and
commanders trade favorable or unfavorable ratings.
A better way is possible. The Department of Defense already has in place a large peer evaluation system that may serve as a useful model for a truly effective performance evaluation tool. The Single Scope
Background Investigation program investigates over
90,000 servicemen and women each year to determine
if they qualify for access to information classified
Top-Secret.6 It does this by conducting face-to-face
interviews with co-workers who can attest to a candidate’s good character and fitness to handle highly
classified data. Typically, these investigations involve
a short interview with three to five co-workers. The
face-to-face interaction provides an opportunity for
the interviewer to assess the interviewee in ways that
are impossible in a written review. It also provides
the opportunity for the interviewer to clarify important issues and more accurately steer the assessment
process.
A peer and subordinate investigation might follow
a similar approach. Under this concept an investigator, potentially a retired military officer, would select
a handful of officer and noncommissioned officer efficiency reports (OERs and NCOERs) written by the
officer in question. These reports could be chosen to
reflect a balance of above average (ACOM) and aver-
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age reports (COM). The investigator would then contact the recipient of each report and arrange an interview. After signing a strict confidentiality agreement,
the interviewee would be asked to comment on the
investigated officer’s leadership style and impact on
the organization during the rated period. Since subordinates are not qualified to assess all aspects of their
leader’s performance, the questioning would focus
narrowly on the climate created by their leadership
and their effect on organizational dynamics. While
ethical issues would certainly be appropriate to discuss in this forum, any specific accusation of misconduct should be directed to the appropriate Inspector
General for investigation.
After concluding the interviews and reviewing
the quality of some number of OERs and NCOERs
written by the candidate, the interviewer would then
draft an investigation summary. This summary would
omit any specific information attributable to the interviewees but would provide a broad assessment. This
assessment would address the officer’s professional
reputation as determined from the interviews and his
stewardship of the profession as shown by the quality
of his written reports. For example, a pattern of reports
from the officer that were consistently over-inflated
would not reflect effective stewardship. The summary
would then be filed in the officer’s restricted Office of
Military Personnel File for consideration by the appropriate command selection board. Since the written report reflects only the interviewer’s impressions
and not the assessments of individual subordinates,
the anonymity of those subordinates is protected. As
an additional protection, candidate officers could be
given the right to view the investigation summary and
request a re-investigation if they could demonstrate
bias in the report.
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The legal challenges to using peer feedback for
evaluation purposes have centered on concerns about
the proper balance between rater anonymity and the
right of the rated officer to see his own report. Replacing the online written survey commonly used in the
civilian world with a face-to-face interview by an experienced leader changes this dynamic considerably.
Interviewers would be free to ask follow-up questions
as required or to disregard unfounded or baseless
allegations.
Wide-spread use of interviews for every promotion board is both cost prohibitive and unnecessary.
Instead, officers choosing to compete for centrally selected command billets at the lieutenant colonel and
colonel level could deliberately opt-in for this level of
scrutiny. If this population set was still too large, the
Human Resources Command could consider a nomination process of highly competitive files that would
then undergo the full investigation. To comply with
the legal constraints identified earlier, this nomination
board would require the regulatory authority to serve
as an independent selection board itself since it would
serve the function of reducing the number of officers
eligible for consideration.
In addition to improving the accuracy of command
selection decisions, a second important effect of this
process would be the impact it might have on organizational politics within units. Since leaders cannot
predict who among their rated population will be selected for the investigation at some point in the future,
it eliminates the functional anonymity that so often
leads to Bathsheba Syndrome behaviors. Additionally,
it provides a tangible incentive to encourage leaders to
invest in the development of their rated subordinates.
Consider the impact on counseling programs Army-
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wide, if it were widely known that the first question of
the subordinate interview was, “Were you effectively
counseled by this officer?” This question, combined
with an in-depth review of efficiency reports written
by the candidate would provide the interviewer with
a perspective on the candidate’s stewardship of the
Army profession.
Asking those officers who wish to compete for
command to submit to additional scrutiny follows a
long established tradition of investigating candidates
for major offices throughout the Federal government.
Such a process has three clear effects: It reduces the
chances of bad leader decisions and the resultant cost
to the institution and its soldiers. It promotes the credibility of those who ultimately are selected. Finally, it
encourages and incentivizes ambitious officers to create the organizational climate that the Army is looking
for within their formations.
Proposal #2: Including Objective Performance Data
in Academic Efficiency Reports.
The 2013 Army Leader Development Task Force
study recommended adopting assessment center
practices in the Army.7 As demonstrated earlier, an
effective assessment center is not so much a place as
it is a process.8 The focus of that process is to provide
objective measures to assess a candidate’s ability to
perform the tasks necessary in a new position. As
such, assessment centers measure potential more than
performance. They focus not on what the candidate
has done, but how he will do in a future assignment.
For this reason, they are best employed at points in a
leader’s career when he is transitioning from one level
of management to another. At these leader inflection
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points, the skills that made a manager successful at
the lower level are often not the ones that will ensure
success at the next. An effectively designed assessment center can fill the gap by helping an organization
assess how the leader would perform at the next level.
The Officer Education System (OES) was designed
originally to develop leaders at these same inflection
points. For this reason, it provides the ideal periods
in an officer’s career to perform assessments. Under
the current OES, officers leave their field assignments
four times in their career to receive training to prepare
them for leadership at the next level. If the Army were
to apply the civilian world’s practices, then the Army
would inject rigorous and detailed assessment activities into the culminating exercises of these four training periods. Officers preparing to graduate from the
Basic course, Captain’s course, Staff College, or War
College would undergo a comprehensive evaluation,
using a number of the techniques described earlier.
These might include tactical scenarios or in-box exercises presented before a panel, and oral and written
exams. These assessment exercises would employ the
best practices of the field but would be uniquely tailored to the skill sets required in likely assignments
following graduation. The officer’s Academic Efficiency Report (AER) would reflect their performance
in the comprehensive exam, along with their relative
class rank. This AER would then accompany the officer to his next duty station where his new commander
would use it to inform assignment decisions in the organization. This would allow commanders to identify
those officers who are prepared to immediately take
on tough assignments and those who require more
development.
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To maintain consistent standards across the force,
the Training and Doctrine Command could then
maintain an accreditation board to assist the various
branch schools in the development of their comprehensive assessment process. Full implementation
across all the schools in the OES program may take
many years given cost constraints. However, a pilot
program at the Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth using the assessment center already standing up there would provide a feasible first
step. Additionally, adopting the Leader Development
Task Force recommendation to administer the Graduate Record Exam at the Captain’s Career Course is another low-cost, first step in this direction.9
One of the key findings of the research into assessment centers was the degree to which their use
promotes a sense of fairness within an organization.
The most recent Center for Army Leadership Annual
Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) showed that
less than half of junior officers thought that promotion
decisions were accurate.10 This survey suggests a disappointing lack of confidence among junior officers in
the ability of the existing performance appraisal system to identify and recognize the most qualified leaders. The success of external assessment centers in the
fire and rescue community described earlier suggests
that their wider use in the Army may help to promote
confidence in the objectivity of Army performance
appraisals.
When Major Dwight Eisenhower graduated first in
his class from the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College (CGSC) in Ft. Leavenworth, KS, in 1926,
one of the most important pieces of information in an
officer’s personnel file was his Staff College class rank.
This rank was based on a rigorous and highly com-
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petitive set of exercises and exams that tested an officer’s tactical skills, intuition, and judgment. General
George Marshall and other senior officers considered
class rank and performance at CGSC to be a critical
determinant of command potential.11 One of the results of this emphasis was a clear incentive for midgrade officers to develop the professional skills and
knowledge that would make them successful on the
battlefields of Europe and the Pacific. Implementation
of an objective and rigorous assessment at CGSC may
go a long way toward promoting a similar commitment to the knowledge and skills at the heart of the
Army profession.
Both of the proposals listed here will require further research to validate rigorously their feasibility.
However, the research has shown that aligning Army
performance evaluation and the Army’s mission command philosophy will require an approach to talent
management that falls along these lines. Implementing a rigorous and objective certification program
modeled after an assessment center will create the
presumption of professional competence necessary to
build organizational trust. Likewise, a process of peer
evaluations that makes leaders directly accountable
for the climate they create in their organization will
enable future boards to select those officers best suited
to the exercise of mission command.
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